THE ROLE OF COST IN DETERMINING WHEN FIRMS OFFER BUNDLES*
研究了竞争性捆绑销售中边际成本节约、产品固定成本和消费者偏好差异的作用，发现纯捆绑可能源于低需求或高固定成本，并用止痛药与减充血剂捆绑案例解释了折扣幅度。
We model competitive bundling and tying, allowing for marginal cost savings from bundling, fixed costs of product offerings, and variation in customer preferences. Pure bundling can arise either because few people demand only one component or because, with high fixed costs, a single product efficiently satisfies customers with diverse tastes. We conclude by analyzing empirically the bundling of pain relievers with decongestants. The discount for the bundled product is large. We argue that our model provides a simpler, more compelling explanation for the size of the discount than the demand‐centered approach to bundling by a monopolist.