An Exploration of Competitive Signalling Equilibria with "Third Party" Information Production: The Case of Debt Insurance
提出一种解决信息不对称问题的新方式：第三方生产信息并定价服务，卖方通过消费服务水平向买方传递质量信号。以借款人选择保险覆盖来向贷款人传递违约概率为例，分析了多种情况下的信号均衡性质。
In markets in which sellers know more about product quality than buyers, but cannot convey their superior information either by directly issuing costly signals of the Spence type or by successfully funding the production of information, I suggest another way in which the informational asymmetry problem can be resolved; a third party can produce the necessary information at a cost and use it to price a service consumed by the sellers. Buyers can then observe a seller's choice of service consumption level and be well informed in equilibrium. In this framework I construct a model in which a borrower's choice of insurance coverage signals its default probability to lenders, and explore the properties of the resulting signalling equilibrium in a variety of cases.