Blockholder Scarcity, Takeovers, and Ownership Structures
研究具有公司治理能力的富裕大股东（重组专家）稀缺时，如何配置“无代理成本资本”，解释不同经济体中所有权结构与重组机制的差异。
Abstract Agency problems in firms are prevalent because of a scarcity of wealthy principals with corporate governance ability, whom we call “restructuring specialists.” We investigate how this scarce resource, “agency cost-free capital,” is allocated. We show that the restructuring specialists may acquire blocks only in those states of the worls in which they can increase firm value the most, which corresponds to a takeover. Firms with dispersed ownership and firms with a financial intermediary as a blockholder can coexist, although they are otherwise identical. The moderl can explain differences in corporate ownership structures and restructuring mechanisms across economies.