The Impact of Information Sharing on the Use of Collateral versus Guarantees
利用波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那的合同数据，研究新信贷登记机构对首次借款人和重复借款人使用抵押品或第三方担保的影响，发现信息共享能减少逆向选择和锁定问题。
Abstract This study exploits contract-level data from Bosnia and Herzegovina to assess the impact of a new credit registry on the use of borrower collateral versus third-party guarantees. Among first-time borrowers, the introduction of mandatory information sharing leads to a shift from collateral to guarantees, in particular for riskier borrowers. Among repeat borrowers, both collateral and guarantee requirements decline in proportion to the length of the lending relationship. These results suggest that information sharing can both reduce adverse selection among new borrowers and hold-up problems among repeat borrowers.