Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty
研究了如何通过限制辩诉交易中的减刑幅度来避免无辜者认罪，发现联邦量刑指南能实现这一社会期望的选择效应，而最高法院的Booker判决削弱了该效应。
A major concern with plea bargains is that innocent defendants might plead guilty. The law can address this concern. By restricting the permissible sentence reduction in a plea bargain, the law can preclude plea bargains in cases with a low probability of conviction (L cases). This will force the prosecutor to (1) select fewer L cases and proceed to trial with these cases or (2) select more cases with a higher probability of conviction (H cases) that can be concluded via a less costly plea bargain. As long as the probability of conviction is positively correlated with the probability of guilt, this selection‐of‐cases effect implies a reduced number of innocent defendants. We argue that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines achieve this socially desirable selection effect and that the recent Supreme Court holding in United States v. Booker dilutes this effect by reducing the guidelines' legal status from binding to advisory.