Negative Vote Buying and the Secret Ballot
研究了“负面买票”（付钱让选民弃权）在公开投票和无记名投票下的不同效果，发现无记名投票反而可能增加买票行为，让更多选民违背本意投票。
We offer a model of “negative vote buying”—paying voters to abstain. Although negative vote buying is feasible under the open ballot, it is never optimal. In contrast, a combination of positive and negative vote buying is optimal under the secret ballot: Lukewarm supporters are paid to show up at the polls, whereas lukewarm opponents are paid to stay home. Paradoxically, the imposition of the secret ballot increases the amount of vote buying—a greater fraction of the electorate vote against their intrinsic preferences than under the open ballot. Moreover, the secret ballot may reduce the costs of buying an election.