Audit quality and properties of analysts’ information environment
研究了审计质量如何影响卖方分析师的信息环境，发现高审计质量使分析师更依赖公共信息，并提升私人与公共信息的精确度。
Abstract We consider how audit quality impacts sell‐side analysts’ information environment. Using the method outlined by Barron et al., we examine whether higher audit quality is associated with differences in the weight analysts place on common information relative to private information, as well as the extent to which audit quality separately impacts the precision of analysts’ private and common information. Our results show that, in instances where analysts revise their earnings forecasts for year t +1 shortly after the release of year t earnings, higher audit quality results in analysts placing more weight on public information. The precision of private (as well as public) information is improved. These results extend our understanding of how audit quality impacts on attributes of analysts’ forecasts and provides support for the argument that audit quality has important capital market implications.