Directors skill and financial reporting quality
基于CEO技能与公司规模匹配的经济学理论，提出衡量董事技能的新指标（董事任职公司总规模），发现该指标与董事经验、财务专长等正相关，且董事会平均技能水平越高，监督质量越好，进而提升公司价值。
Abstract Motivated by theoretical models in economics which show that there is matching between CEO skill and firm size, we introduce a new measure of director skill which is based on the aggregate size of firms on which the director serves as an independent director. We validate our measure by showing that it is positively associated with director experience, financial expertise, industry expertise and managerial experience. We then examine whether our average measure of skill across board members is positively associated with monitoring quality. Controlling for the endogenous relationships between board composition and financial reporting quality, we find a positive association between our board measure for skill and monitoring quality, and we show that directors have a causal impact on monitoring effort and outcomes. Furthermore, consistent with the enhanced monitoring provided by skilled directors, we document a positive association between the level of and changes in our measure and firm value.