Subsidization and Choice in the Group Health Insurance Market
研究发现，提供员工多种保险选项并要求保费分摊的团体健康保险计划，其单位价格（保费与预期赔付之比）更低，且低风险者的价格降幅更大，表明高风险者受补贴的程度在可选计划中有所减轻。
Abstract This study investigates the effect of group health insurance plan choice on insurance unit price. The empirical findings suggest that the unit price of insurance, as measured by the ratio of the premium to expected indemnity benefits, is lower in group plans that offer employees a choice of different insurance options and require a premium contribution than it is in plans lacking at least one of these two features. The analyses suggest that lower unit prices are related to an increase in indemnity benefits and that the reduction in the unit price is greater for lower risks. The findings indicate that although subsidization of high risks by low risks occurs with group health insurance, the degree of subsidization is less when employees are offered a choice of health insurance plans.