To What Extent Does the Financial Reporting Process Curb Earnings Surprise Games?
研究财务报告流程（尤其是年度报告与中期报告对比）对管理者避免负盈利惊喜行为的约束效果，发现年度报告能减少向上盈余管理，但可能增加向下预期管理。
ABSTRACT Managers play earnings surprise games to avoid negative earnings surprises by managing earnings upward or by managing analysts' earnings expectations downward. We investigate the effectiveness of the financial reporting process at restraining earnings surprise games. Because the annual reporting process is subject to an independent audit and more rigorous expense recognition rules than interim reporting, it provides managers with fewer opportunities to manage earnings upward. We document that, relative to interim reporting, annual reporting reduces the likelihood of income‐increasing earnings management and, to a lesser extent, of negative surprise avoidance, but increases the magnitude of downward expectations management. Our findings suggest that regulatory attempts to monitor corporations' internal checks and balances are likely to be more effective at curbing upward earnings management than at mitigating negative surprise avoidance.