Strategic Auditor Behavior and Going‐Concern Decisions
通过博弈模型分析客户如何通过更换审计师来避免持续经营意见及其自我实现预言，发现审计师在客户解聘威胁和预言效应下更不愿出具该意见，而客户在意见分歧和预言效应下更愿更换审计师。
This paper analyzes a game‐theoretic model in which a client can potentially avoid a going‐concern opinion and its self‐fulfilling prophecy by switching auditors. Incumbent auditors are less willing to express a going‐concern opinion the more credible the client's threat of dismissal and the stronger the self‐fulfilling prophecy effect. Similarly, the client is more willing to switch auditors the more likely it is that auditors' reporting judgments will differ and the stronger the self‐fulfilling prophecy effect. Further, with greater noise in the auditor's forecast of client viability, the auditor tends to express fewer going‐concern opinions.