Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid for Investment Skill?
利用瑞典共同基金经理的独特注册数据，发现薪酬与收入呈凹形关系，且对业绩的敏感性出奇地弱，公司层面的固定效应、收入和利润对薪酬有较强解释力。
Compensation of mutual fund managers is paramount to understanding agency frictions in asset delegation. We collect a unique registry-based dataset on the compensation of Swedish mutual fund managers. We find a concave relationship between pay and revenue, in contrast to how investors compensate the fund company (firm). We also find a surprisingly weak sensitivity of pay to performance, even after accounting for the indirect effects of performance on revenue. Firm-level fixed effects, revenues, and profits add substantial explanatory power for compensation. Received April 25, 2017; editorial decision August 21, 2017 by Editor Matthew Spiegel. Authors have furnished supplementary code, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.