Stocks or Options? Moral Hazard, Firm Viability, and the Design of Compensation Contracts
研究在给风险厌恶的经理提供努力激励时，股票和期权哪种更优。发现只有当企业面临较大破产风险（如财务困境或初创企业）时，股票才优于期权；其他情况下期权更优。
We consider the choice between stocks and options to provide effort incentives to a risk-averse manager. We show that stocks can dominate options as a means of motivation only if nonviability risk is substantial, as in financially distressed firms or start-ups. Options dominate stocks for other firms. These results hold regardless of the existing portfolio of the manager. We provide empirical evidence that higher bankruptcy risk is indeed correlated with more use of stock. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.