PENSION DESIGN WITH A LARGE INFORMAL LABOR MARKET: EVIDENCE FROM CHILE
研究了当工人可通过非正规就业逃避缴费时，养老金制度的设计如何影响财政与福利，发现智利提高最低养老金隐含税率可降低支出23%而不损害退休收入。
This article investigates the fiscal and welfare trade‐offs involved in designing a pension system when workers can avoid contributing by working informally. Using a life‐cycle model of labor supply and saving decisions, I structurally estimate preferences and earnings opportunities in the formal and informal sectors using data on Chilean households. I find limited support for formal jobs rationing. Instead, mandatory pension contributions significantly encourage informality. Policy experiments show that Chile could lower minimum pension spending by 23%—while guaranteeing the same income to retirees—if the minimum pension's implicit tax rate was increased to 60%.