Voluntary Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information: A Complete Equilibrium Characterization
证明在经典的财务市场博弈模型中，除了已知的完全披露均衡外，还存在多个均衡，其中好类型披露而坏类型不披露，完全披露均衡只是均衡集的一个极限点。
The so‐called disclosure principle is a ‘puzzle’ in the accounting literature: Game theoretic models of financial markets show that in equilibrium firms should disclose all their private information. Yet, the result is not convincing. Researchers have therefore built sophisticated models in order to demonstrate for which reasons the disclosure principle might fail. This note shows that even in the original model there are multiple equilibria. In those equilibria good types disclose and bad types do not. The commonly known full disclosure equilibrium is a limit point of the equilibrium set.