Intermediation and (Mis‐)Matching in Insurance Markets—Who Should Pay the Insurance Broker?
研究了独立保险中介在匹配重要的市场中的作用，比较了收费和佣金两种报酬制度，发现中介完全诚实下两者等价，但策略行为下报酬影响建议质量，错配可能赋予中介市场势力，并为或有佣金提供了理由。
A bstract This article addresses the role of independent insurance intermediaries in markets where matching is important. We compare fee‐based and commission‐based compensation systems and show that they are payoff equivalent if the intermediary is completely honest. Allowing for strategic behavior, we discuss the impact of remuneration on the quality of advice. The possibility of mismatching gives the intermediary substantial market power, which will not translate into mismatching if consumers are rational. Furthermore, we offer a rationale for the use of contingent commissions and address whether or not the ban of any commission payments is an appropriate market intervention.