Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets
研究代理人投资并匹配成对创造剩余时，事前所有权分配如何影响投资效率，分析投资过高或过低的条件及帕累托改进的可能性。
We analyse a model in which agents make investments and match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath et al. (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium investments are generally inefficient. We work here with a more structured and tractable model to analyse investment inefficiencies. We provide conditions under which investment is inefficiently high or low and when changes in the pretransfer \nownership claims on the surplus will be Pareto improving, and examine how the degree of heterogeneity on either side of the market affects investment efficiency.