按绩效付费项目中的虚报编码证据

Evidence of Upcoding in Pay-for-Performance Programs

Management Science · 2018
被引 58
人大 A+FT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

研究发现,在按绩效付费项目中,医院可能虚报医院获得性感染以规避罚款或增加报销,导致自我报告的质量指标不可靠,每年给医保造成约2亿美元损失。

Abstract

Recent Medicare legislation seeks to improve patient care quality by financially penalizing providers for hospital-acquired infections (HAIs). However, Medicare cannot directly monitor HAI rates and instead relies on providers accurately self-reporting HAIs in claims to correctly assess penalties. Consequently, the incentives for providers to improve service quality may disappear if providers upcode, i.e., misreport HAIs (possibly unintentionally) in a manner that increases reimbursement or avoids financial penalties. Identifying upcoding in claims data is challenging because of unobservable confounders (e.g., patient risk). We leverage state-level variations in adverse event reporting regulations and instrumental variables to discover contradictions in HAI and present-on-admission (POA) infection reporting rates that are strongly suggestive of upcoding. We conservatively estimate that 10,000 out of 60,000 annual reimbursed claims for POA infections (18.5%) were upcoded HAIs, costing Medicare $200 million. Our findings suggest that self-reported quality metrics are unreliable and, thus, that recent legislation may result in unintended consequences. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2996 . This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.

按绩效付费编码升级医院获得性感染自我报告质量指标