Accounting for Crises
提供了首批实证证据，表明公共信号的精确度可以协调危机发生，并利用17个国家的68次货币和系统性银行危机数据，发现仅在低精确度国家，危机前的会计信号显著较低。
We provide among the first empirical evidence, consistent with recent macro global game crisis models, that shows that the precision of public signals can coordinate crises. In these models, self-fulfilling crises independent of fundamentals can occur only when publicly disclosed signals of fundamentals have high precision; poor fundamentals are the sole driver of crises only in low precision settings. We exploit a key publicly disclosed signal of fundamentals, namely accounting data, for 68 currency and systemic banking crises in 17 countries. We find that precrisis accounting signals of fundamentals are significantly lower only in low-precision countries.