Self‐reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement when there are Criminal Teams
研究了犯罪团队中的自我报告机制，发现通过设计囚徒困境可在几乎零成本下实现最大威慑，但合作行为可能使最优罚款低于最高额。
We extend the analysis of self‐reporting schemes to criminal teams. When the violators behave non‐cooperatively, maximum deterrence can be reached at virtually no cost by designing a prisoners' dilemma. One drawback of such a scheme is that it might induce cooperative behaviour in the self‐reporting stage. If the cooperation rate is increasing the benefits from cooperation, it is optimal to impose less than the maximum fine if both individuals self‐report. The same result occurs for imperfect self‐reporting technologies where the conviction of one agent does not necessarily lead to a conviction of his accomplice.