Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision
研究了激励方案中故意不透明作为策略的利弊，在代理人知道哪项任务成本更低的两任务道德风险模型中，不透明方案能减少代理人博弈行为但增加风险，并识别出不透明方案优于透明方案且消除代理人隐藏信息成本的环境。
Abstract We study the benefits and costs of “opacity” (deliberate lack of transparency) of incentive schemes as a strategy to combat gaming by better informed agents. In a two‐task moral hazard model in which only the agent knows which task is less costly, the agent has an incentive to focus his effort on the less costly task. Opaque schemes, which make a risk‐averse agent uncertain about which task will be more highly rewarded, mitigate such gaming but impose more risk. We identify environments in which opaque schemes not only dominate transparent ones, but also eliminate the costs of the agent's hidden information.