Rules of proof, courts, and incentives
分析民事诉讼中法院决策的法律原则和程序设计，旨在当证据不完美且可能被当事人扭曲时，为潜在侵权人提供谨慎行事的激励。研究发现，优势证据标准与普通法排除规则相结合可实现效率，但可能产生低效均衡，此时举证责任指南可作为协调工具；若法院采取更积极的纠问式角色，则无需指南。
We analyze the design of legal principles and procedures for court decision making in civil litigation. The objective is the provision of incentives for potential tort-feasors to exert care when evidence is imperfect and may be distorted by the parties. Efficiency is consistent with courts adjudicating on the basis of the preponderance of evidence standard together with common law exclusionary rules. Inefficient equilibria may nevertheless also arise under these rules. Burden of proof guidelines are then useful as a coordination device. Alternatively, guidelines are unnecessary if courts are allowed a more active or inquisitorial role in contrast to that of passive adjudicator. Copyright (c)2008, RAND.