INEFFICIENT STANDARD ADOPTION: INERTIA AND MOMENTUM REVISITED
研究了消费者可能采纳低效标准的原因，指出当存在代际更替时，当前一代不会考虑对过去和未来各代的成本收益；若标准为专有，企业诱导采纳的激励与社会激励不一致，源于企业无法完全获取标准带来的未来剩余。
This article examines the possibility that consumers will adopt an inefficient standard. When there are successive generations of consumers, the current generation will not consider the costs and benefits to past and future generations of adopting a new standard. If a standard is proprietary, the incentives of a firm to induce adoption of the standard generally do not match the social incentives. The divergence is caused by the firm's imperfect ability to appropriate the future surplus generated by the standard.