Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets
基于18个新兴市场1433家公司的数据，发现管理层控制权超过现金流权时企业价值更低，而大非管理层股东控制权持股与企业价值正相关，且这些效应在股东保护弱的国家更显著。
This paper investigates whether management stock ownership and large non-management blockholder share ownership are related to firm value across a sample of 1433 firms from 18 emerging markets. When a management group's control rights exceed its cash flow rights, I find that firm values are lower. I also find that large non-management control rights blockholdings are positively related to firm value. Both of these effects are significantly more pronounced in countries with low shareholder protection. One interpretation of these results is that external shareholder protection mechanisms play a role in restraining managerial agency costs and that large non-management blockholders can act as a partial substitute for missing institutional governance mechanisms.