Managerial Risk-Taking Incentive and Firm Innovation: Evidence from FAS 123R
利用2005年FAS 123R会计准则强制股票期权按公允价值入账带来的薪酬变化，发现CEO的风险激励（VEGA）对企业创新有正向因果效应，该规则实施后风险激励下降导致核心业务创新和探索性发明显著减少。
We investigate how chief executive officers’ (CEOs) risk incentive (VEGA) affects firm innovation. To establish causality, we exploit compensation changes instigated by the FAS 123R accounting regulation in 2005 that mandated stock option expensing at fair values. Our identification tests indicate a positive and causal effect of CEOs’ VEGA on innovation activities. Furthermore, dampened managerial risk-taking incentive after the implementation of FAS 123R leads to a significant reduction in innovation related to firms’ core business and explorative inventions. It implies that managers diversify their innovation portfolios and decrease explorative inventions to curtail business risk when their risk-taking incentive is reduced.