Bank loan loss provisions: a reexamination of capital management, earnings management and signaling effects
利用1990年资本充足率监管变化，检验银行贷款损失准备金是否用于资本管理或盈余管理，发现支持资本管理假说，但未发现盈余管理证据，且准备金与未来盈余变化及股票回报负相关，与信号效应相反。
This paper exploits the 1990 change in capital adequacy regulations to construct more powerful tests of capital and earnings management effects on bank loan loss provisions. We find strong support for the hypothesis that loan loss provisions are used for capital management. We do not find evidence of earnings management via loan loss provisions. We also document the reasons for the conflicting results on these effects observed in prior studies. Additionally, we find that loan loss provisions are negatively related to both future earnings changes and contemporaneous stock returns contrary to the signaling results documented in prior work.