Industry Expertise of Independent Directors and Board Monitoring
研究了独立董事的行业经验是否影响董事会监督效果，发现审计委员会中有行业经验的独立董事能显著减少盈余管理，薪酬委员会中有此类董事能降低CEO超额薪酬，董事会中有此类董事能提高CEO离职对业绩的敏感度并改善多元化并购的收购方回报。
Abstract We examine whether the industry expertise of independent directors affects board monitoring effectiveness. We find that the presence of independent directors with industry experience on a firm’s audit committee significantly curtails firms’ earnings management. In addition, a greater representation of independent directors with industry expertise on a firm’s compensation committee reduces chief executive officer (CEO) excess compensation, and a greater presence of such directors on the full board increases the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity and improves acquirer returns from diversifying acquisitions. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that having relevant industry expertise enhances independent directors’ ability to perform their monitoring function.