Implications of Economic Shocks for CEO Performance Evaluation
研究了经济冲击如何影响CEO的客观与主观绩效评估，发现冲击后企业更依赖主观评估，随时间推移再回归客观评估，基于1992-2013年美国高管薪酬数据。
I study the implications of economic shocks for objective and subjective CEO performance evaluation. A shock perturbs pay-setting parties' information about the firm and the CEO. I argue that pay-setting parties then lack information they need for evaluating the CEO objectively, and de-emphasize objective CEO performance evaluation in favor of subjective CEO performance evaluation; over time, pay-setting parties become better informed about the firm as well as the CEO, and increasingly use again objective CEO performance evaluation. My evidence, which uses data on objective and subjective CEO performance evaluation in US executive pay between 1992 and 2013, is consistent with my argument.