Financial Expertise of the Board, Risk Taking, and Performance: Evidence from Bank Holding Companies
研究发现美国银行独立董事的金融专长在金融危机前与风险承担正相关，危机前与绩效弱相关，危机中则与更低绩效强相关，表明金融专长董事可能支持了增加风险的行为。
Abstract Financial expertise among independent directors of U.S. banks is positively associated with balance-sheet and market-based measures of risk in the run-up to the 2007–2008 financial crisis. While financial expertise is weakly associated with better performance before the crisis, it is strongly related to lower performance during the crisis. Overall, the results are consistent with independent directors with financial expertise supporting increased risk taking prior to the crisis. Despite being consistent with shareholder value maximization ex ante, these actions become detrimental during the crisis. These results are not driven by powerful chief executive officers who select independent financial experts to rubber stamp strategies that satisfy their risk appetite.