Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment, and the Establishment of "Rival" Enterprises
研究雇佣科学家从事研发项目时，考虑其可能将项目信息用于竞争性企业，分析最优雇佣决策和合同设计，并探讨科学家离职创办或加入竞争企业的条件。
This paper considers the problem of hiring scientists for research and development projects when one takes explicit account of the fact that the scientist may be able to use the information acquired during the project in a rival enterprise. Management's problem is to determine an optimum labor policy for its project. The policy consists of an employment decision and a labor contract. Given optimum behavior, it is straightforward to analyze the effect of the potential for mobility of scientific personnel on project profitability and on research employment. We also formalize conditions under which one would expect to observe a scientist leaving his employer to set up or join a rival.