Modeling the Antecedents of Preferences for Incomplete Contracts in Bilateral Trade: An Experimental Investigation
通过实验研究，发现交易方对不完全合同的偏好取决于其感知的风险，而风险感知又受感知的议价能力和公平偏好（分配公平与程序公平）的影响。
ABSTRACT: Contracts constitute an important control mechanism. Their design is influenced by the preferences of the contracting parties, in addition to firm-level economic transaction costs. This study conducts an experiment to explore the antecedents of preferences for a less complete contract in a trade setting. Results from an experiment indicate that the preference for a more complete versus a less complete contract depends on the perceived riskiness of the incomplete contract, which is influenced by the perceived bargaining power and fairness preferences (namely, distributive and procedural fairness preferences) of the contracting parties. In other words, we find evidence that suggests that choosing the completeness of a contract is a form of risk-taking, and that the preference for a more incomplete contract is influenced by perceived power and fairness preferences.