Political Booms, Financial Crises
研究发现，政府民意支持率的上升（政治繁荣）能比信贷繁荣等传统指标更好地预测金融危机，但这一效应仅在新兴经济体成立，因为发展中国家政府更倾向于利用不可持续的信贷繁荣来提升支持率，而非采取政治上代价高昂的预防措施。
Political booms, measured by the rise in governments’ popularity, predict financial crises above and beyond better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in emerging economies. We argue that governments in developing countries have stronger incentives to “ride” unsound credit booms in order to boost their popularity, rather than implementing corrective policies that could prevent crises but are politically costly. We provide evidence of the relevance of this mechanism, partly by constructing a new cross-country dataset on government popularity based on opinion polls.