Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth
通过内生增长均衡模型，分析官僚腐败与经济增长的关系，探讨人力资本积累与政治资本积累的权衡，并在不同政治体制下检验相关命题。
There Appears to be significant diversity in the incidence of bureaucratic corruption across countries at different stages of economic development and under different political and economic regimes. Little theoretical or empirical analysis has been offered, however, on the link between corruption, government, and growth. The paper attempts to fill the void through equilibrium models of endogenous growth. "balanced growth" is derived as a balancing act between accumulating human capital, which engenders growth, and accumulating political capital, which mainly assures bureaucratic power. The analysis focuses on the interplay between investment in these two types of capital and its implications for long‐term growth under alternative political regimes. Some propositions are tested and confirmed empirically.