Counterparty Risk and the Establishment of the New York Stock Exchange Clearinghouse
利用1892年纽约证券交易所建立清算所这一历史事件，以同时挂牌的联合证券交易所为对照，发现多边净额结算显著降低了由结算风险引起的股价波动并提升了资产价值，表明清算所能通过减少网络传染和对手方风险来改善市场稳定性。
We examine the effect of the establishment of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) clearinghouse in 1892 on counterparty risk using a novel historical experiment. During this period, the NYSE stocks were dual-listed on the Consolidated Stock Exchange (CSE), which already had a clearinghouse. Using identical securities on the CSE as a control, we find that the introduction of multilateral net settlement through a clearinghouse substantially reduced volatility of NYSE returns caused by settlement risk and increased asset values. Our results indicate that a clearinghouse can improve market stability and value through a reduction in network contagion and counterparty risk.