Shareholder Wealth Consequences of Insider Pledging of Company Stock as Collateral for Personal Loans
研究内部人将公司股票抵押给银行获取个人贷款这一普遍但研究不足的现象，发现抵押会通过增加股价崩盘风险和降低公司风险承担来损害股东财富。
Abstract We study a widespread yet under-explored corporate governance phenomenon: the pledging of company stock by insiders as collateral for personal bank loans. Utilizing a regulatory change that exogenously decreases pledging, we document a negative causal impact of pledging on shareholder wealth. We study two channels that could explain this effect. First, we find that margin calls triggered by severe price falls exacerbate the crash risk of pledging firms. Second, since margin calls may cause insiders to suffer personal liquidity shocks or to forgo private benefits of control, we hypothesize and find that pledging is associated with reduced firm risk-taking. Received March 2, 2017; editorial decision January 24, 2019 by Editor David Denis. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.