BILATERAL MARKET STRUCTURES AND REGULATORY POLICIES IN INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE MARKETS
研究了国际电话市场中双边寡头竞争与监管政策，发现统一结算费率要求下比例回报规则推高费率但抵消了对通话价格的影响，零售竞争和比例回报规则增加净结算支付，多通道交换提升市场效率。基于47国与美国1992-2004年数据验证了理论。
We develop models of bilateral oligopoly with traffic exchanges to study the competition and regulatory policies in the international telephone markets. Under the requirement of uniform settlement rates, the proportional return rule (PRR) inflates the rates and hence neutralizes PRR's effect on calling prices. Retail competition and PRR increase net settlement payments. Market efficiency is improved when there are multiple channels for traffic exchanges. Using a panel of 47 countries that exchanged traffic with the United States between 1992 and 2004, we test the effects of bilateral market structures and the U.S. policies. The empirical results support our theoretical findings.