Price Regulation and Environmental Externalities: Evidence from Methane Leaks
研究了美国天然气分销企业在减少天然气泄漏上的支出，发现价格监管导致企业支出不足，低于泄漏气体的商品价值，而加速管道更换的支出则高于商品价值与气候效益之和。
We estimate expenditures by US natural gas distribution firms to reduce natural gas leaks. Reducing leaks averts commodity losses (valued at around $5/Mcf [thousand cubic feet]), but also climate damages ($27/Mcf) because the primary component of natural gas is methane, a potent greenhouse gas. In addition to this private/social wedge, incentives to abate are weakened by this industry’s status as a regulated natural monopoly: current price regulations allow many distribution firms to pass the cost of any leaked gas on to their customers. Our estimates imply that too little is spent repairing leaks—we estimate expenditures substantially below $5/Mcf, that is, less than the commodity value of the leaked gas. In contrast, expenditures on accelerated pipeline replacement are in general higher than the combination of gas costs and climate benefits (we estimate expenditures ranging from $48/Mcf to $211/Mcf). We conclude by relating these findings to regulatory-induced incentives in the industry.