Indexing Executive Compensation Contracts
通过校准标准薪酬模型分析美国CEO样本，发现指数化期权行权价收益很小，完全指数化会使薪酬成本增加50%，且主要负面效应是降低激励，这为“为运气付薪”的常见做法提供了合理性。
We analyze the efficiency of indexing executive pay by calibrating the standard compensation model to a large sample of U.S. CEOs. The benefits from indexing the strike price of options are small, and fully indexing all options would increase compensation costs by 50% for most firms. Indexing has several effects with overall ambiguous outcome; the quantitatively most important effect is to reduce incentives, because indexed options pay off when CEOs’ marginal utility is low. The results also hold if CEOs can extract rents and extend to the case of indexing shares. Our findings may justify the common practice of “pay-for-luck.”