Incentive-Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions
研究一对一可转移支付匹配市场中，激励相容与多种稳定性概念的一致性。发现事后稳定性过强，引入事前和中期稳定性，并分析其满足条件。
I study the consistency of incentive compatibility with several stability notions for a one-to-one matching market with transfers. Ex post stability, studied in the matching literature, is too strong to be satisfied together with incentive compatibility. Therefore, I introduce weaker stability notions: ex ante stability and interim stability. Although ex ante stability is consistent with incentive compatibility when agents are ex ante identical or when the market is balanced, interim stability can only be satisfied when there is one agent on the short side of the market, as in auctions. Which stability is appropriate depends on when agents can block.