Rating Shopping or Catering?An Examination of the Response to Competitive Pressure for CDO Credit Ratings
研究评级机构在债务抵押债券（CDO）评级中是“选购”还是“迎合”竞争压力，发现双重评级反而违约率更高，且评级调整预示后续降级，对投资者和监管者有警示。
We examine whether "rating shopping" or "rating catering" is a more accurate characterization of rating agency interactions regarding collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Although investors paid a premium for dual ratings, AAA CDO tranches rated by both Moody's and S&P defaulted more frequently than tranches rated by only one of them, which is inconsistent with pure rating shopping. Rating agencies made upward adjustments beyond their model when their competitor had more lenient assumptions. Finally, consistent with rating catering, S&P's and Moody's adjustments and disagreements at security issuance were reflected in subsequent rating downgrades, suggesting that adjustments were harmful. The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.