Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump’s Trade Wars
利用美国与其贸易伙伴之间的贸易升级，研究报复性关税是否具有政治针对性，发现报复措施精心针对特朗普，中国和欧盟在政治目标与经济损害之间做出不同权衡。
Abstract We use the recent trade escalation between the USA and its trade partners to study whether retaliatory tariffs are politically targeted. We find comprehensive evidence using individual and aggregate voting data suggesting that retaliation is carefully targeted to hurt Trump. We develop a simulation approach to construct counterfactual retaliation responses allowing us to quantify the extent of political targeting while also studying potential trade-offs. China appears to place great emphasis on achieving maximal political targeting. The EU seems to have been successful in maximising political targeting while at the same time minimising the potential damage to its economy.