Beyond the Balance Sheet Model of Banking: Implications for Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy
实证发现银行在贷款中会通过影子银行替代和资产负债表留存两种调整方式，这些方式显著影响政策效果，如资本要求对贷款的影响被削弱，而量化宽松等二级市场干预影响更大。
We empirically document two adjustment margins that are usually absent from the predominant “bank balance sheet lending” view of financial intermediation. For the shadow bank substitution margin, shadow banks substitute for traditional banks among loans that are easily sold. For the balance sheet retention margin, banks switch between balance sheet lending and selling loans based on their balance sheet strength. Estimates from a structural model show that these margins significantly shape policy responses, dampening the effect of capital requirements on lending whose costs are borne by wealthier borrowers. Secondary-market disruptions such as quantitative easing have significantly larger impacts on lending than capital requirements.