Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores
研究了基于性别的税收政策，发现由于家庭内部议价导致男女劳动供给弹性不同，对男性征收更高边际税率是最优的。
Gender-based taxation (GBT) satisfies Ramsey's rule because it taxes at a lower rate the more elastic labor supply of women. We study GBT in a model in which labor elasticities emerge endogenously from intrahousehold bargaining. We explore the cases of superior bargaining power for men, higher male wages, and higher female home productivity. In all cases, men commit to a career in the market, take less home duties than women, and have lower labor supply elasticity. When society resolves its distributional concerns efficiently with gender-specific lump sum transfers, GBT with higher marginal tax rates on (single and married) men is optimal.