Incentivizing Financial Regulators
研究了美国证交会执法律师的晋升激励如何影响其执法行为，发现更强激励导致更多执法、更严厉处罚，并影响证券市场。
Abstract I study how promotion incentives within the public sector affect financial regulation. I assemble individual data for all SEC enforcement attorneys between 2002 and 2017, including enforcement cases, salaries, and ranks. Consistent with tournament model, attorneys with stronger promotion incentives are involved in more enforcement, especially against severe misconduct, and in tougher settlement terms. For identification, I rely on cross-sectional tests within offices and ranks and on exogenous variation in salaries resulting from a conversion to a new pay system. The findings highlight a novel link between incentives and regulation and show that the regulator’s organizational design affects securities markets.