Deviations from Norms and Informed Trading
研究发现，受规范约束的投资者只有在掌握有力信息时才会偏离个人或机构规范，且这类偏离投资事后能获得较高的异常收益，表明偏离规范可视为知情交易的信号。
Abstract Investment managers are subject to personal and institutional norms that can constrain their investment choices. We conjecture that norm-constrained investors deviate from such norms only when they have compelling information, and we predict that deviating investments earn relatively high abnormal returns ex post. Consistent with our conjecture, we find that institutions averse to holding lottery-like stocks or sin stocks earn relatively high abnormal returns when they choose to hold such stocks. We find similar but weaker results for deviations from broader style categories. Overall, our evidence indicates that deviations from established institutional or social norms signal informed investing.