Overlapping Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy
研究了交叉持股如何影响企业的研发投资和产出，发现当研发溢出足够大时，交叉持股可能提升社会福利和消费者剩余，对反垄断政策有参考价值。
This paper considers cost-reducing R&D investment with spillovers in a Cournot oligopoly with overlapping ownership. We show that overlapping ownership leads to internalization of rivals’ profits by firms and find that, for demand not too convex, increases in overlapping ownership increase (decrease) R&D and output for high (low) enough spillovers while they increase R&D but decrease output for intermediate levels of spillovers. There is scope for overlapping ownership to improve welfare and consumer surplus, provided that spillovers are sufficiently large. The results obtained are robust when R&D has commitment value and in a Bertrand oligopoly model with product differentiation.