Advertising as a search deterrent
研究垄断企业如何通过广告披露部分信息来阻止消费者搜索，当搜索成本低时，部分信息披露成为有效工具，透明政策虽减少搜索支出但社会合意性取决于搜索成本大小。
Abstract This article examines a monopoly firm's incentive to disclose information through advertising when consumers can choose between buying immediately and searching for additional information. Because sales drop when search reveals low match values to consumers, the firm has an incentive to deter search. We show that partial information disclosure emerges as a useful tool for search deterrence when search costs are low. Informative advertising and consumer search can be viewed as complements in producing information. Although transparency policies reduce search expenditures and improve purchase decisions, whether they are socially desirable depends on the magnitude of search costs.