Hostile Resistance to Hedge Fund Activism
研究发现，面临对冲基金激进主义时，存在代理问题或投资者协调威胁的目标公司常采取敌意抵抗，导致市场负面反应和业绩下滑；但若对冲基金以代理权争夺、诉讼或要约收购反制，则能逆转负面影响。
When facing hedge fund activists, target firms often fight back. Targets with agency problems and those confronting the threat of investor coordination frequently engage in hostile resistance by implementing governance changes associated with managerial entrenchment. The market negatively responds to hostile resistance, and unless hedge funds counterresist, these campaigns have worse operating performance, faster activist exit, and fewer mergers than do campaigns without hostile target resistance. By contrast, when hedge funds counterresist with proxy fights, lawsuits, or unsolicited tender offers, the impact of hostile target resistance is reversed, and these campaigns have similar outcomes to campaigns without hostile target resistance. Received September 8, 2016; editorial decision March 18, 2018 by Editor Francesca Cornelli.