Asymmetric Information and Intermediation Chains
构建了一个简洁的双边贸易模型，解释为何买卖双方之间常存在多层中介链。研究发现，拥有市场势力的中介能改善贸易效率，且信息相近的中介链可抑制价格扭曲。
We propose a parsimonious model of bilateral trade under asymmetric information to shed light on the prevalence of intermediation chains that stand between buyers and sellers in many decentralized markets. Our model features a classic problem in economics where an agent uses his market power to inefficiently screen a privately informed counterparty. Paradoxically, involving moderately informed intermediaries also endowed with market power can improve trade efficiency. Long intermediation chains in which each trader's information set is similar to those of his direct counterparties limit traders' incentives to post prices that reduce trade volume and jeopardize gains to trade.