The Fashion Lottery: Cooperative Innovation in Stochastic Markets
研究了时尚市场中创新活跃但原创者几乎不受模仿保护的现象，提出合作创新模型，认为允许有限模仿的产权制度能作为集体保险机制，缓解需求不确定下的回收失败风险。
The fashion market is an anomaly: innovation is vigorous, but original producers are substantially unprotected against imitation. We account for this anomaly through a cooperative innovation model in which producers prefer an incomplete property regime that permits some imitation to alternative regimes that permit no imitation or all imitation, independent of budget constraints. A property regime that permits positive but limited levels of imitation operates as a collective insurance mechanism that alleviates the risk of recoupment failure in a market characterized by demand uncertainty, long lead times, skewed returns, and rapid product obsolescence. This model is compatible with producers’ selective enforcement of intellectual property protections, privately administered quasi‐copyright schemes, and institutional mechanisms that facilitate seasonal coordination of design outcomes. This model potentially generalizes to certain other markets in which innovation persists despite substantial imitation.